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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Over the past five years, the International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF) has received 
growing evidence of systematic conditions in the cotton industry that lead to widespread use 
of forced and child labor, affecting millions of children and adults in countries including 
India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Egypt, Pakistan, and China.  ILRF is committed to building 
awareness of the worldwide problem, promoting the use of trade policy instruments to 
combat child labor in global cotton production, and building ethical alternatives to cotton 
produced by forced and child labor.  This report is the result of a targeted initiative in Central 
Asia, due to the extent of cotton production in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan combined with the 
politics of operating within the world’s most repressive regimes.   
 
 With support from the Open Society Institute, ILRF partnered with the Social Institute 
for Youth and Civilization in Tajikistan and its network of advocates in the Khojand area to 
address forced and child labor in cotton harvesting.   
 
Project partners conducted an extensive research study of farmers and workers 
(students) through surveys and roundtable discussions, primarily in the Sughd region.  
Researchers surveyed 101 students.  Partners in Tajikistan also analyzed contracts signed 
between administrators and students at four state universities, TSULBP, TSUC, KSU, 
KBTUT, for the 2006-2007 school year regarding state mandates for cotton harvesting. 
 
The research revealed considerable human rights and environmental concerns within 
Tajikistan’s cotton industry.  There are numerous factors contributing to the problem, 
including a complex and repressive relationship among the government, investors, and 
farmers, state imposed quotas with short production lead times, ignorance and lack of 
enforcement of legal rights, low quality raw production, lagging infrastructure and 
environmental factors, and ultimately, corruption.   
 
Failure of the government of Tajikistan to enforce national legislation against forced 
and child labor and to implement its international human rights commitments will further 
contribute to the country’s notorious human rights record and the region’s environmental 
degradation.  To effectively address the myriad human rights and environmental problems in 
Tajikistan’s cotton industry, ILRF and project partners provide specific recommendations for 
key institutions in Tajikistan and international NGOs at the end of this report. 
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I.  DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL PROFILE OF TAJIKISTAN 
Tajikistan has a population of 6.3 million people, nearly half of whom are under 14 
years of age.  The major religion is Islam, and major languages are Tajik, Uzbek, and 
Russian.  Average life expectancy is 61 years for men and 66 years for women.1   
Between the 11th and the 16th century, Tajikistan was heavily ruled by the Turks, 
Mongols and Uzbeks.  The Russian Empire took over Tajikistan from the Uzbeks. During 
that time (1897-1917), the nation experienced many economic and political advances, 
including the introduction of cotton.  A revolt against Russian forces beginning in 1916 led to 
the Russian Revolution and the eventual transformation of Tajikistan into a full Soviet 
republic in 1929. 
 
During the 1980s a social movement began that led to Tajikistan’s declaration of 
sovereignty in 1991.  However, civil war soon broke out.  The war lasted five years (1992-
1997) and resulted in nearly 50,000 lives lost, 500,000 people homeless, a crippled economy, 
and a legacy of political corruption and violence.  Imomali Rakhmonov was elected president 
in 1994, and due to a referendum approved in 2003, is set to remain in power until 2020.  
International observers report that the elections that assured his power have been neither free 
nor fair.  Further, relations with neighbouring countries are hostile, particularly with 
Uzbekistan. 
 
As a result of this political chaos, Tajikistan is rife with human rights abuses.  Human 
Rights Watch reports that fraudulent elections, media censorship, religious persecution, 
obstruction of political opposition, and abuses by security forces are among the country's 
most serious human rights problems.  
 
II. LEGISLATION REGARDING LABOR RIGHTS  
 
At least in theory, Tajikistan is in full compliance with the international treaties on 
labour standards.  Labor rights provisions are stipulated in the Labour Code of Tajikistan.   
 
Forced Labor:  Article 8 of the Code prohibits forced labour except when performed 
during military service and in extreme circumstances.  The Civil Code of the Republic of 
Tajikistan (Chapters 800-802) states that contractual obligations can be changed only by the 
mutual agreement of all parties, and it is prohibited to place additional obligations on the 
parties.  Article 35 of the Constitution of Tajikistan prohibits forced labour and involvement 
of women and children in hazardous and underground work. It also guarantees the right to 
labour, free choice of profession, protection of labour, and social guarantees from 
unemployment and equal wages for equal work.   
 
Child Labor:  The Labour Code established a minimum age of 15 for employment in 
Tajikistan; in exceptional cases (and with the consent of parents and the Commission of 
Youth Affairs of the local council) employment is allowed for children of age 14 years as 
trainees performing uncomplicated work.  The Labour Code also specifies the amount of 
hours that minors are allowed to work: between 15-18 years of age the working hours cannot 
exceed 35 hours per week, and minors between the ages of 14-15 cannot exceed 24 hours of 
work per week.  Tajikistan law also prohibits the labour of persons under the age of 18 in 
                                                 
1 BBC News, Tajikistan Country Profile, March 29, 2007.  United Nations 2005 statistics. 
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underground, hard labour, in harmful working conditions, lifting and carrying heavy weights 
and in other cases determined by law. 
 
The Labour Code provides specific stipulations for students; work hours are restricted 
to only half of those allowed for non-student minors, and students are entitled to 
supplementary paid vacations, shorter working hours, and other privileges.2  Further, Article 
19 of the Labour Code prohibits the disruption of the direct duties of education professionals 
and involvement of pupils and students in agricultural and other labour activities not related 
to the academic process. 
 
Chapter 26, Paragraph 4 of the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Education” 
states: “In educational institutions, regardless of organizational legal forms and form of 
ownership, it is prohibited to divert pedagogical workers from performing their primary 
responsibilities, involve students, pupils, learners, post-graduate students to agricultural and 
other works not related to education and upbringing.” 
 
Despite these theoretical legal protections, local authorities and school administrations 
continue to compulsorily involve students in an annual cotton-picking campaign that they 
claim to be “voluntary.”  
 
Health and Safety:  Worker safety is addressed in Tajikistan’s Criminal Code.  
Article 154 includes punishment for infringement of safety measures for workers.  Article  8 
of the Labour Code stipulates that employers and local officials are responsible for 
maintaining healthy working environments, including sanitary and epidemiological safety, 
disease prevention, and informing workers about safety issues. 
 
Tajikistan is also a party to numerous international human rights treaties to protect 
workers, including the following United Nations (UN) and International Labour Organization 
(ILO) conventions:  
 
• UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
• UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
• UN Convention on the Rights of the Child;   
• ILO Convention on Minimum Age (1973); 
• ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor (1999); 
• ILO Convention on Forced Labor (1930); and, 
• ILO Convention on Abolition of Forced Labor (1957). 
 
According to the Constitution of Tajikistan and the Law on International Legal Acts 
of 1999, Tajikistan recognizes these international agreements as a fundamental element of the 
country’s legal system.  However, in practice these protections are not enforced. 
III.  OVERALL ECONOMY OF TAJIKISTAN 
Tajikistan is widely recognized as the poorest of the post-Soviet republics.  The civil 
war severely affected the country’s economic and physical infrastructure, causing a decline in 
already frail industrial and agriculture production.  In 2002, Tajikistan was ranked number 
                                                 
2 Articles 186, 187, 188 of Tajikistan Labour Code. 
 5
“Continued privatization of 
medium and large state-owned 
enterprises would further 
increase productivity, however, 
[Tajikistan's economic situation] 
remains fragile due to uneven 
implementation of structural 
reforms, weak governance, 
widespread unemployment, and 
the external debt burden.” 
- CIA World Factbook 
103 among 162 countries by the Human Development Index, and since 
then has only risen 11 points.   
Tajikistan’s economy is mainly driven by agriculture and 
depends highly on the export of cotton both as a source of income and 
employment.  Agriculture accounts for 60-70% of employment and 20% 
of GDP.  As of 2005, the country’s GDP was $2.3 billion.  Tajikistan 
lost more than 50% of its GDP during the civil war, as well as an 
estimated $7 billion in physical damage.3  The country’s main exports 
include cotton, aluminium, electricity, fruit, and textiles.  Cotton and 
aluminium provided 80% of total export earnings in 2004.   
An estimated 67-80% of the country’s population lives below the poverty line.4  Over 
two thirds of the population lives on less than $2.15 a day.  The average monthly salary is 
slightly above $20 and the unemployment rate remains high.5  The majority (74%) of 
Tajikistan’s impoverished population resides in rural areas.  
Since the civil war, the country’s economic woes have been further exacerbated by a 
lack of progressive investment in the agriculture sector and environmental degradation.  
Arable land decreased from 905.6 thousand hectares to 718.6 between 2004 and 2005, largely 
as a result of water mismanagement.6   
IV.  TAJIKISTAN’S COTTON INDUSTRY 
  
According to the Asian Development Bank’s Country Strategy and Program Update 
for 2005-2006, cotton - Tajikistan’s only commercial crop - contributes 15% of the country’s 
exports, 39% of tax revenues, and 22% of the GDP, and employs 50% of the country’s labor 
force.  As the fourth largest exporter of cotton in the world, there is a great demand on 
workers to maintain production. 
 
History of Cotton Production in Tajikistan 
 
Prior to the country’s independence, the Soviet Union provided all financing for the 
country’s cotton industry.  The Soviet Central Planning Authority set production quotas for 
the country each year.  Tajikistan’s Ministry of Agriculture was given inputs including 
infrastructure services to plan production for the year. AgroProm and the Ministry of 
Agriculture were responsible for allocating the capital necessary to meet target quotas 
established by the government to local administrators known as Hakumats.   
 
The targets given to the Hakumats were based on the determined quality and 
production capabilities decided by the Ministry, however the Hakumats paid little attention to 
these recommendations and simply passed unrealistic quotas on to farm managers.  The farm 
managers were nominated by Hakumats and elected by their workers, who received salaries.  
Both the farm managers and workers received in kind basic necessities or other products at 
subsidized prices.  
  
                                                 
3 Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org). 
4 Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org). 
5 World Bank, Tajikistan Country Brief 2006. 
6 Tajikistan state statistical committee. 
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The raw cotton was transported to assigned ginneries for further processing and then 
to the appropriate Soviet authorities. Meticulous production records were kept whereby 
payments were made back to AgroProm against the farmer’s account.  Farmers did not meet 
the allocated quotas were generally replaced.   
 
After the civil war, the government lacked the resources necessary to sustain cotton 
production.  As a result, independent financers emerged to provide an alternative means of 
financing for the country’s industry.  Paul Reinhart SA was the first such company, which 
company lent the government $138 million USD from Credit Suisse First Boston.  Other 
foreign financers began entered the financing market and making loans directly to farmers 
through local brokers in Tajikistan.  
 
The primary public financing institution for the cotton industry is AgroInvest 
(formerly AgroProm Bank).  However, foreign financers have followed Paul Reinhart SA’s 
lead by entering the market; they are commonly referred to as “futures companies” that loan 
through local brokers.  Newly restructured farms enter into contracts with these futures 
companies, who provide inputs up front on credit to the farmers.  In exchange, farmers are 
expected to produce a certain amount of cotton destined for predetermined gins.  Once the 
raw cotton is processed into lint for export, the farmer’s account is credited based on the 
prevailing price on the Liverpool Stock Exchange.  If the farmer does not deliver the 
expected amount of cotton, debt is incurred with accruing interest. 
 
Cotton Production Trends 
 
Since becoming a sovereign nation in 1991 and the subsequent civil war, Tajikistan 
has experienced a sharp decline of nearly 200,000 tons of cotton production.  While 
production increased somewhat between 1991-2002 (as demonstrated in the figure below), 
the level of production in comparison to areas planted indicates a lack of the country’s ability 
to produce at maximum capacity.    
 
Source: FAO/WFR Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Tajikistan August 1, 2002 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y7285e/y7285e00.htm 
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Cotton production decreased again in 2005, due to poor weather and fewer planting 
areas.  Poor quality inputs and the industry’s lack of mechanization continued to affect 
overall production, as evidenced in the following table. 
 
 
Production and Yields of Major Agricultural Crops, 1985-2005 
        
  2004 2005    2004 2005 
in thousands of   
tons   
in kilograms 
per hectares    
Production   Yield    
  of which:   of which:     
  Raw cotton 557 448 Raw Cotton  1910 1516 
  Grain 734 935 Grain  1970 1970 
  Feed corn 295 339 Feed Corn  14223 12210 
  Potatoes 527 555 Potatoes  17400 19620 
  Vegetables 679 718 Vegetables  18300 18680 
  Fruits 144 148 Fruits  2400 2430 
  Hay 443 219 Hay   2060 1380 
 Source: Tajikistan State Statistical Committee, Available at: http://www.stat.tj/english/tables.htm 
 
 
Cotton Growing Regions 
 
Tajikistan is separated into five different regions/provinces. The two main cotton-
producing regions are the Khatlon region and the Sughd (Lenininbod) Region.  While 93% of 
Tajik land is mountainous, nearly seven percent (7%) of the country’s arable land is located 
in the Sughd and Khatlon regions.  According to the World Bank, 65% of Tajikistan’s total 
population lives in these two regions.  Within these two regions, 72% of the population are 
considered “poor” and 75% are considered “extremely poor”. 
 
The Sughd region is located in the northwest corner of the country well known as the 
Fergana Valley, bordering Uzbekistan to the west and Kyrgyzstan to the east. There are 
sixteen different districts in the area, most of which are the country’s most fertile cotton 
producing land.  
 
The Khatlon region is the most populated region and is located in the southwest 
region of Tajikistan and includes about 25 different districts. Afghanistan borders the region 
to the southeast and Uzbekistan boarders Khatlon to the west.  A listing of districts in the 
Sughd and Khatlon regions are included in the appendix. 
 
Tajik Cotton Export Market  
 
The State Committee on Statistics for Tajikistan estimated that during the first nine 
months of 2006, cotton fiber exports consisted of 7.9% of Tajikistan’s total exports.  
However, during the same nine-month period in 2005, cotton fiber exports equalled 74,000 
tons, earning $79.5 million USD.  The estimated loss is approximately $6.6 million USD due 
to lagging exports in 2006.  The following table demonstrates the revenue from exports 
between 2000 and 2005. 
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Source:  Tajikistan State Statistical Committee, Available at: http://www.stat.tj/english/tables.htm 
 
 
Tajikistan consumes approximately 10-12% of its total cotton production 
(approximately 25,000 tons of raw cotton fiber) for its limited textile industry.  The 
remaining amount of cotton fiber is processed in Tajik gins into yarn for export or exported 
as fiber.  Russia is consistently Tajikistan’s primary export market, holding nearly 30% of the 
market share. Tajik cotton fiber is also sold on the Liverpool Cotton Exchange, and to 
brokers in Latvia and Switzerland.  Other CIS countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
are among the top importers of Tajik cotton fiber. The Tajikistan Daily Digest cited the 
largest cotton importers during the first period of 2005 as Latvia with 48.3%, Russia with 
24.9%, Iran with 14.7%, Switzerland with 6.7% and China with 4.7%.1  Tajik cotton also 
appears in various forms in Asian markets including Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, and 
Bangladesh.  
 
V.  LABOR RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN TAJIKISTAN’S COTTON INDUSTRY 
 
There are significant and growing concerns regarding Tajikistan’s deteriorating 
human rights record, both directly and indirectly linked to cotton production and export.  
Major human rights concerns in the cotton industry include child labor, forced labor, health 
and safety violations, inhumane working and living conditions, and inadequate payment, as 
described below.  In addition to these human rights concerns, Tajikistan’s extensive cotton 
production and mismanagement of natural resources is a major factor in the country’s 
environmental degradation. 
 
Child Labor 
 
Given the dearth of capable adults, cotton producers have come to rely on illegal labor 
from minors to meet state-imposed production quotas.  The civil war in the 1990’s 
significantly affected the size of the population, as approximately 50,000 people were killed.  
Further, approximately 630,000 capable working adults leave Tajikistan every harvesting 
season for higher paying jobs, primarily in Russia.  Many child laborers are forced into their 
work, as described below. 
 
Child labor is undeniably cheap and immensely profitable.  “Children as young as 
seven are forced to assist with the harvest in all five Central Asian states.  In 2004, almost 
40% of Tajikistan’s cotton was harvested by children.”7  In 2005, approximately 22,775 
                                                 
7 “White Gold: The Trust Cost of Cotton” Environmental Justice Foundation, 2005. 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  
  In Millions of US Dollars   
Total exports, fob 784 652 739 797 915 909 
   Cotton fiber 84 62 128 193 162 144 
   Electricity 92 79 67 55 58 53 
   Other 608 511 544 549 695 712 
         
  Volumes, in unites indicated   
Cotton fiber (thousand tons) 74 68 137 149 133 133 
Electricity (million kWh) 3,908 4,047 3,874 4597 4451 4258 
Cotton fiber ($/T) 1.14 0.91 0.93 1.30 1.21 1.08 
Electricity ($/kWh) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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“At nights 
picked cotton in 
order to meet the 
quota” 
- Tajik student 
people worked to harvest the cotton crop in the Sughd region alone.  Most of the laborers 
were young students under the age of eighteen. 
 
Forced Labor  
 
Each year, thousands of students are mobilized for the state’s cotton harvesting 
campaign using various threats and violent intimidation tactics at the hands of teachers and 
university administrators.  Despite a clear stipulation in the Law on Education protecting the 
rights of students from illegitimate action by administrators and teachers, students’ rights are 
routinely violated. 
 
Many universities have specific stipulations against conscripted labor, but these are 
also empty regulations.  Over 500 students at one university alone, KBTUT, are forced to 
abandon their schooling to participate in the state’s cotton-picking campaign.  Students who 
refuse to participate are sanctioned heavily, from expulsion to violence.  At the Khujand State 
University (KSU), for example, dozens of students are expelled each year for ignoring the 
university’s cotton-picking campaign (an internal campaign which is in itself illegal).    
 
Of the 101 students surveyed by researchers for this report, 98% had participated in 
cotton harvesting; 57% did not do so voluntarily.  Many students specifically stated that they 
were forced to participate in cotton harvesting; 76% were threatened with expulsion, exam 
failure, and debt.  Some students are able to pay their way out of the conscripted labor, but 
they likely face other punishments.  An overwhelming majority of students surveyed (88%) 
indicated that they would prefer to study rather than pick cotton. 
 
Not only are students across the country forced to work against their will, but they are 
also demanded to reach unrealistic state-mandated production quotas.  Most student are not 
paid if they do not meet these quotas, and over half (52%) of surveyed students admitted to 
being forced to do additional work if they failed to meet their quotas, including sweeping, 
cooking, cleaning, picking cotton in the dark, and other punishments.  
 
Working Conditions 
 
Workers’ health and safety is routinely placed in jeopardy by the practices of the 
Tajik government in compelling labor for cotton harvests.  Workers are forced to toil long 
hours, are exposed to hazardous work (including toxic pesticides), experience inadequate 
shelter and food, limited access to clean drinking water, and lack medical attention. 
 
Because of the unrealistic state-mandated quotas, many students 
and children are forced to work extremely long hours, many past dark.  
Surveyed students remarked that, “At nights we picked the rest of the 
unpicked cotton” and, “at nights we were not allowed to sleep – we were 
forced to cut wood.” 
 
Further, working conditions are unsafe due to a lack of law enforcement supervision.  
Eighty percent (80%) of surveyed students noted that they were not guarded by law 
enforcement agencies.  While this creates a general safety issue, it also exacerbates problems 
related to quotas, as workers regularly steal from each other’s cotton on the farms where they 
are paid by the amount produced. 
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“Even a dog  
did not eat the 
food that they 
organized  
for us.” 
- Tajik student 
In response to how much and how often workers are paid, one student responded: 
 “Little! Clean cotton costs $3.5 USD and we were paid 10 dirhams  
[approximately $2USD] for our work. Humiliating.” 
Aside from the detrimental health impact of long hours of manual labor, cotton 
picking is hazardous in nature.  Workers use dangerous equipment and are regularly exposed 
to toxic pesticides.  To further exacerbate these problems, most have no access to medical 
attention.  Surveyed students noted that they were not checked by a doctor for the entire 
duration they were forced to work in the fields, and even those with obvious illnesses or 
injuries rarely receive treatment.  This neglect results in undue illnesses, complications or 
even death from untreated illnesses, and even suicide. 
 
Living Conditions 
 
In addition to inadequate working conditions, the living conditions that students are 
required to reside in during their labor are also harsh.  Nutrition and hygiene are of particular 
concern.  Half of students surveyed complained that the living conditions were “bad.” 
 
In terms of food, students report inadequate calories for the work 
that is required and unsafe food preparation.  A clear majority (72%) of 
surveyed students described the food as unsatisfactory.  Despite a lack of 
calories, students are often forced to refuse meat when it is offered because 
it becomes spoiled from not being boiled properly.  There is also a general 
lack of sanitation in preparing meals, resulting from the general poor 
hygiene at the farms and a lack of clean water for cooking.  Some students 
reported that they only water available was from irrigation canals.   
 
Personal hygiene is also a major concern.  Students are often promised a bath, but 
ultimately are forced to take showers outside, enduring cold water and air temperatures, as 
well as unclean water.   
  
The living arrangements provided for students are often a considerable distance by 
foot to the fields where they toil (1.5 km on average) and to water sources.  Farmers often 
become irritated by foot traffic through farms.  Students are not always provided beds to 
sleep on or other basic necessities. 
 
Payment 
 
The amount and frequency of financial compensation is of particular concern.  Many 
students surveyed reported never receiving any payment.  This is in large part due to many 
farmers’ stipulation of paying only workers who pick above their quota.  However, as 
previously mentioned, these quotas are often impossible to meet.  Further, the payment that 
many students would receive often goes directly to their food, or else they are forced to split 
their salaries with cooks and tea house workers.   
 
 
Environmental Degradation 
 
In addition to the myriad human rights abuses inherent in Central Asian cotton 
production, years of mismanagement of natural resources have resulted in considerable 
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“A lack of regulatory 
oversight of investor lending 
to agriculture has been a 
factor in existing farm debt 
problems.” 
- Asian Development Bank
environmental degradation that will continue to negatively affect production levels.  Some 
scientists refer to Central Asia as enduring a “salt crisis.”  Indeed, 37.5% of previously arable 
Tajik soil has been negatively affected by years of poor water management.  Derelict 
infrastructure has led to considerable salinization, affecting soil fertility and ultimately 
decreasing available agricultural land.  The fall of Communism brought an end to centrally 
planned water management, resulting in these and other environmental problems downstream 
in other cotton-producing countries such as Uzbekistan, where 66% of soil is affected.8 
 
 
VI.  FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO ABUSES IN THE WORKFORCE 
 
The human and environmental rights concerns within Tajikistan’s cotton industry are 
the result of numerous factors including a complex and repressive relationship among the 
government, investors, and farmers, state imposed quotas with short production lead time, 
ignorance and lack of enforcement of legal rights, low quality raw production,  lagging 
infrastructure and environmental factors, and ultimately, corruption.  Surveyed farmers 
specified that their most pressing barriers and obstacles are debt, corruption, low salaries for 
employees, funds, and transportation.   
 
Debt and the Role of Investors  
 
The dependent and convoluted relationship between investors and farmers keeps 
farmers in a persistent and growing state of debt under which it is impossible to thrive. 
Following Tajikistan’s civil war, the government funnelled capital lent by foreign banks to 
local banks, and then to investors at the local level for cotton financing.  Thus began the long 
dispute concerning the amount of debt owed to these local investors, who hold that local 
farmers still owe large sums of money.  Debts incurred by the state Kholhoz level were 
effectively distributed to the dekhan (local private farmer level), so investors claim that they 
are owed $322 million USD and an unknown compound interest accrued.  
 
According to the country’s Minister of Agriculture, Voris 
Madaminov, debts in the cotton sector have been growing 
since 1996-1997.  The Minister cites the lack of compliance 
to contracts between investors and farmers as the main reason 
for the perpetuation of farmers’ debt. 
 
Farmers estimate that one hectare of land used for cotton growth carries between 
$1,000 and $2,000 USD of debt, and the general size of an average farmer cooperative is 
between 3.5 hectares and 75 hectares.  Local farmer companies surveyed in this research 
found that averages of total debt for the farmers range from 14,000 somoni ($4,200 USD) to 
21,000 somoni ($6,200 USD). 
 
Further, farmers do not always view cotton as the most profitable or their first choice 
of crop to produce on their land, and would rather produce other crops such as potatoes or 
wheat.  However, given the heavy debt under which they are forced to operate, farmers are 
effectively forced to produce more cotton while still incurring additional debt to investors. 
 
 
                                                 
8 “White Gold: The Trust Cost of Cotton” Environmental Justice Foundation, 2005. 
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“Current investor 
contracts do not 
place equal 
responsibilities and 
obligations between 
the lender and 
borrower parties.”   
- Asian Development 
Bank 
Farmers’ Inability to Access Bank Loans  
 
Adding to the farmers’ persistent indebtedness to investors, farmers lack proper 
access to credit from banks that would allow for them to purchase necessary inputs through 
cash or credit.  Given the complex relationship with investors, farmers are not allowed access 
to bank loans that would provide them with hard cash to service some of their debts 
effectively, purchase materials and supplies at fair market price, and pay their employees 
properly.  
 
Local farmers surveyed for this study cited their heavy 
dependence on investor companies as the main reason they are unable to 
obtain credit from banks.  Farmers estimate that a $2,000 USD loan at a 
5% interest rate for 1 hectare of land would be enough to significantly 
develop the sector at the farmer level.  Farmers indicated that direct 
access to bank credits to develop independent financing operations 
would considerably improve their financial situation.  However, 
farmers’ pre-existing contracts with investors and the absence of bank 
accounts among farmer companies have kept them from realizing such 
independent financing.  
 
Duopoly in Purchasing Inputs and Selling Outputs 
 
The fact that the government and investors are the only entities with which farmers 
can purchase materials and supplies and sell their cotton contributes to their indebtedness and 
repression.  Investor-farmer contracts (for which farmers have little input) stipulate that 
investors are solely responsible for providing inputs to farmers, but they are not required to 
provide them at real market price.  As a result, investors provide necessary materials and 
supplies at a heavily inflated price, thus increasing farmers’ indebtedness to them.  For 
example, one farmer in the Zafarabad region recalls paying nearly $70 USD for 200 kg of 
saltpetre bypass, a material fertilizer, when the real market price is only $30 USD.  This 
happens frequently with fuel, which is in short supply and high demand among farmers.  
Other necessary inputs include seed, fertilizer, and other growing materials and equipment.   
 
Furthermore, once the raw cotton is produced, farmers do not receive the full market 
price for their raw crop since the state and investors are the only entities to which farmers can 
sell.  The government and joint venture companies are the only entities in the country allowed 
to purchase raw cotton and produce the cotton to further stages, such as lint, yarn or fabric for 
export or to be sold for further processing either in the country or abroad.  In the Sughd 
region, for instance, Khujand Invest Cotton and Olimi Karimzod are the main procurement 
companies that contract with international cotton exporting companies such as Paul Reinhart 
for international sale of the cotton at its various stages of production. 
 
State Imposed Quotas and Short Production Lead Time  
 
Unrealistic state imposed quotas on cotton production affect local farmers’ ability to 
decide which types of crops to grow.  Heavy influence to grow cotton as the major cash crop 
originates not just from the state, but also from investors and the prominent “futures 
companies” in the region (such as Khujand Invest Cotton and Mastchoh Invest), many of 
which are owned and operated by relatives of government officials and authorities. 
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Further, the state and investors tend to operate on very short ordering schedules, 
leaving farmers little time to pick the cotton and meet a company’s order.  As a result of this 
rushed environment, workers are forced to pick cotton for long hours in inhumane conditions.  
 
Ignorance of Legal Rights and How to Protect Them 
 
Most farmers unfortunately are not privy to financing or legal education that could aid 
them in reforming their business to be more profitable or ward off the investors’ tendencies to 
exploit their ignorance of their legal rights.  This is only exacerbated by the government’s 
failing to enforce existing legal rights, as described later in this section. 
 
Failure to Meet International Quality Standards  
 
While farmers are forced to purchase inputs at above fair market-rate prices, their 
goods are sold at prices below the market rate internationally.  Although the government 
recently adopted a decree to improve cotton to international quality standards, in practice 
there have been no improvements.  The Minister of Agriculture claims that the cotton 
produced in Tajikistan should meet international standards, but the country still adheres to 
CIS standards.  The CIS standards were developed by Uzbek scientists and do not take into 
account higher standards in, for instance, the strength of a grade of cotton.  The lack of such 
international standards attributes to the current lower export price of Tajik cotton.  The 
Minister estimates that losses accrued on account of the outdated CIS standards equals on 
average $80-85 USD per ton of exported cotton.  The Minister projects that the increase in 
quality standards and shift toward international standards could raise Tajik cotton export 
profit nearly $15 million USD in a given year.  To make up for the loss in quality, farmers are 
under considerable pressure from the state to produce a high quantity of raw cotton, 
inherently leading to worker rights violations. 
 
Corruption   
 
All of the above problems are exacerbated by a corrupt political environment.  
President Rachmonnov has made light of the debt issues faced by struggling farmers.  On 
March 9, 2005, the President signed the Farm Debt Resolution Strategy (FDRS) and held a 
strategy retreat was held in June 2005; in September 2005 the Prime Minister signed the 
strategy work plan into law.  Additionally, an Independent Commission for Debt Resolution 
was created with representatives from the State Advisor on Economic Policy and the National 
Bank of Tajikistan.  However, these laws did not address fundamental problems in the 
system, namely a lack of regulatory oversight of investor lending to agriculture.   
 
As the only commercial crop of Tajikistan, cotton is attractive to the local authorities 
for the purposes of personal financial gain.  According to grassroots sources, government 
representatives are “involved” in illegal revenue generation from investors and farmer 
cooperatives.  Transparency International’s 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked 
Tajikistan 144 out of 159 countries.  Tajikistan has made some attempts, at least on the 
surface, to combat corruption by trying officials and judges for taking bribes.  Given that the 
current practice of cotton harvesting and production gives millions of US dollars to 
government officials and investors, the policy of monoculture is not likely to change.  At 
least 10% of cotton export revenues go directly the budget of republic, and likely the pockets 
of its officials.   
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Lack of Enforcement of Labor Rights 
 
Despite Tajikistan’s international commitments to protect labor rights and significant 
related developments in national legislation, these laws are continuously violated.  Factors 
include the inefficiency of law enforcements system, soft sanctions for violation of laws, 
small labor force, abuse of power and positions, and widespread corruption. 
On January 1, 2003, the government held a special meeting to address forced labor of 
students in cotton fields, in theory emphasizing that such a practice is prohibited.  The 
resulting Decree No. 87 (February 14, 2003), issued by the Minister of Education, states that 
all heads of regional, city and district Departments of Education must prohibit forced labor of 
students.  However, this decree has been continuously ignored by the local administrators. 
 
Labor laws in Tajikistan are “enforced” through a weak system of labor inspection. 
There are few labor inspectorates for the number of establishments they have to cover. 
Worse, the inspectors are untrained, underpaid, inefficient, and in most cases, corrupt. Their 
budget is very limited that they cannot travel even outside the major cities, and thus cannot 
monitor the agricultural industry where the most of the children work.  Despite a State Labor 
Inspection decree to receive and consider complaints about labor rights infringements and 
take measures to eliminate violations, in practice this decree is not followed.  For example, in 
2004, six workers submitted written complaints to the Office of Public Prosecutor in the 
Sughd region regarding forced labour, but the government ignored their claims. 
Provisions to protect workers under the Labor Code are not observed either.  One 
factor is that the fines for such violations are too minimal.  According to Article 41 of the 
Administrative Code of Tajikistan, fines for labor rights violations range from only one to ten 
minimal wages ($2.50 USD to $25 USD). 
 
Legalization of Forced Labor in University Contracts 
 
Universities in Sughd region frequently abuse their authority, setting illegal conditions 
for enrolling students by mandating their participation in cotton harvesting.  Students enrolled 
are forced to follow clearly illegal and unconstitutional requirements.  “Contracts” between 
administrators and students are not analyzed by the public attorney’s office.  The forced labor 
inherent in these contracts is a blatant violation of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, Civil Code of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan  
 
One third (32%) of students surveyed for this study were not familiar with these 
contracts; of those who were, students noted only vague mention of cotton harvesting.  Many 
contracts simply state that “students must participate in public events,” leaving the 
universities free to interpret the “agreement” as “willingness” to participate in cotton 
harvesting.  The four universities analyzed within this study address the issue accordingly:   
 
• Tajik State University of Law, Business and Politics in Khujand (TSULBP):  
According to university contracts with students, students must follow all the orders of 
TSULBP.  Paragraph 4.1.5 includes a provision whereas, “The Student must take 
active part in the public life of the University, including agricultural events, at the 
order of the government authorities”.  A description of these “events” is 
conspicuously vague.   
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• Khujand State University (KSU):  The university’s contract with students does 
not have provisions specifying KSU’s responsibilities to create conditions necessary 
for successful and fruitful study of students and providing maximum opportunities for 
them to thrive.  Contracts state that KSU reserves the right to expel a student if s/he 
does not follow the internal rules.  As a result, dozens of students are expelled from 
the University each year for ignoring the cotton-picking campaign (by violating the 
internal rules of the University).  
 
• Tajik State University of Commerce (TSUC):  Chapter 3 of TSUC’s agreement 
with its students stipulates that students are obliged to take part in the public life of 
the University, city and region.  Again, “public life” is conspicuously vague and open 
to free interpretation by the university.     
 
• Khujand Branch of Technological University of Tajikistan (KBTUT):  As with 
other universities, KBYUT’s contract with its students mandates participation in 
“public events.”  In this agreement, KBTUT reserves the right to expel students from 
the University for violating any provisions of the contract.  Each year, more than 500 
students from KBTUT are forced to participate in the country’s cotton-picking 
campaign as a “public event.”   
 
Lagging Infrastructure and Environmental Factors 
 
Tajikistan’s cotton growing capacities are decreasing while Tajik raw cotton is sold 
for exceptionally understated prices.  Surveyed farmers cited transportation as a primary 
challenge - there is already such an extensive shortage of fuel that in some districts there isn’t 
enough to transport harvests in the fields to the ginning plants for further processing. 
 
Farmers lack the knowledge (and the access to gain such knowledge) of better 
business practices, including bank financing and modern technology to create higher yields of 
better quality cotton.  Tajikistan’s lagging infrastructure and very low mechanized cotton 
industry result in lower crop yields, further exacerbating the pressure on farmers to produce 
greater quantities. 
 
As previously mentioned, years of mismanagement of natural resources have resulted 
in considerable environmental degradation that will continue to negatively affect cotton 
production.  Rather than addressing the root cause of the problem by repairing the drainage 
system years ago, Tajikistan and neighboring countries have instead kept moving to new 
plots of land and destroying them as they go along.  Over one-third of previously arable land 
has been destroyed by salinization.  This factor is expected to continue to increase as the 
government continues to neglect its ailing natural resource infrastructure. 
 
All of the combined factors leading to farmers’ heavy debt lead to the need to hire the 
most inexpensive labor possible. Without access to the cash or credit necessary to mechanize 
their production, farmers are forced to rely on physical laborers, most often students who are 
forced to work in the fields. 
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VII.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 To effectively address the myriad human rights and environmental problems in 
Tajikistan’s cotton industry, the authors recommend the following actions for key institutions 
in Tajikistan and international NGOs. 
 
President of the Republic of Tajikistan: 
 
• Strengthen control over the activities of local government administrations to prohibit 
forced labor, particularly forced labor of children.  For example, commit all the 
mayors of cities and districts (official representatives of the President of the Republic 
of Tajikistan at the local level) to report monthly on their actions to prohibit and 
prevent forced child labor. 
 
• Create a special monitoring group, consisting of public associations and international 
organizations, to identify instances of forced labor in Tajikistan. 
 
• Investigate cases of involvement of government officials in corrupt relationships with 
investors and farmers, and appropriately punish those found guilty of organizing or 
authorizing forced labor. 
 
• Promote information exchange with the public through the President’s web site, and 
ensure timely and appropriate reaction to citizens’ complaints and reports of forced 
labor in the country. 
 
Government of the Republic of Tajikistan should: 
 
• End the compulsory state procurement system and allow farmers to trade their cotton 
in the open market.  
 
• Minimize the state intervention in agriculture production at the local and national 
levels. 
 
• Review the system of state quota and prices paid to farmers that encourage child and 
forced labor in cotton production. 
 
• Increase the prices paid to cotton producers to reflect real market prices. 
 
• End the practices of mobilization of public employees, students and school children in 
the annual cotton picking campaign, and punish local officials who are responsible for 
promoting conscripted labor. 
 
• Adhere to the UN and ILO conventions banning forced labor and child labor and 
ensure their enforcement. 
 
• Conduct a complete audit of operations of investors (aka “futures companies”), 
together with the representatives of Paul Reinhard, to identify and addres exploitation 
techniques. 
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• Audit contracts between investors and farmers to identify cases of fraud and 
commitment to forced labor. 
 
• Develop and adhere to an agricultural policy that would facilitate export of crops 
other than cotton in order to prevent soil depletion and soil erosion.  
 
International Investment Companies: 
 
• Strengthen control over the activities of investors and ensure legal, transparent and 
rational use of funds on their part. 
 
• Demand the use of rigorous independent supply chain monitoring for cotton fiber for 
export. 
 
• Cooperate with local and international organizations working to prevent forced labor 
and create a list of investors involved in forced and child labor. 
 
• Publish regular reports on what investment companies are actually doing to prevent 
exploitation and forced labor. 
 
• Establish policies denying investments for the companies that encourage directly or 
indirectly forced and child labor. 
  
• Pressure the Tajikistan government to make the cotton sector more transparent and 
financially equitable. 
 
Attorney General of the Republic of Tajikistan: 
 
• Strengthen control over rigorous and mandatory enforcement of the provisions of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, Labor Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, 
and the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Education” in relation to forced labor 
among students. 
 
• Conduct regular inspections of the activities of investors for fraud against farmers. 
 
• Launch criminal prosecution against government officials and school administrators 
responsible for involvement of schoolchildren, young people and public employees 
into forced labor. 
 
• End the practice of legalizing forced labor as a “voluntary” participation in the annual 
cotton-picking campaign, and investigate each case appropriately. 
 
• Investigate cases where students are expelled from schools and universities during the 
cotton harvest and orders issued by school principals and university heads regarding 
these incidents. 
 
• Raise the issue of forced labor, fraud by investment companies, and debts of farmers 
regularly to the Coordination Council of the law enforcement agencies of Tajikistan. 
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Minister of Justice of the Republic of Tajikistan: 
 
• Conduct a comprehensive analysis of the national legislation of the Republic of 
Tajikistan with the aim of implementing international obligations to prohibit forced 
labor and labor discrimination. 
 
• Facilitate a discussion on the issue of forced labor in Tajikistan and make a legal 
analysis of the decisions and orders issued by government officials. 
 
• Conduct a legal analysis of contracts between universities and students in order to 
abolish any provisions allowing forced labor. 
 
• Analyze and legally evaluate agreements between investors and farmers with regard 
to their compliance with the current legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan. 
 
• Analyze the registration documents of investor companies to monitor compliance with 
the charter goals and objectives. 
 
Minister of Education of the Republic of Tajikistan: 
 
• Prohibit the practice of mass involvement of schoolchildren and students in cotton-
picking campaign and ensure comprehensive implementation of the state education 
program in secondary schools and universities. 
 
• Stop and prevent the practice of “voluntary involvement” of schoolchildren and 
students in the annual cotton-picking campaign. 
 
• Demand that school principals and university heads strictly follow the Law of the 
Republic of Tajikistan “On Education” and the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On 
Special and Higher Education.” 
 
• Punish and dismiss those heads of universities and schools who encourage forced 
labor. 
 
• Create a “Parents’ Committee against Forced Child Labor” for systematic monitoring 
and analysis of unlawful practices. 
 
International NGOs: 
 
• Increase public awareness among consumers of labor abuses in all aspects of the 
cotton industry, and promote ethical alternatives to cotton produced by forced and 
child labor.   
 
• Work with local NGOs to effectively assist workers.  Specifically, address 
rehabilitation of former child laborers, legal strategies to sanction offending 
employers and win redress for abused workers, and engagement with domestic and 
multinational corporations to push for systematic changes in sourcing practices. 
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• Support continued domestic advocacy in Tajikistan, including round table discussions 
with farmers, continued fact-finding regarding the extent of farm debts and their 
impact on the forced and child labor problem, education and outreach among 
university students (particularly regarding contractual obligations to contribute farm 
labor), and support domestic advocates to bring criminal and administrative cases in 
local courts. 
 
• Promote the use of trade policy instruments to combat child labor in global cotton 
production.  
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APPENDIX 1:  COTTON GROWING DISTRICTS IN TAJIKISTAN 
 
 
 
Districts in the Sughd Region 
Aini Istarawshan Quairoqqum Jabbor Rasulov 
Asht Isfara Mastchoh Chkalov 
Ghafurov Kanibodom Nov Shahriston 
Zafarabad Kuhistoni Panjakent Ghonchi 
 
 
 
 
Districts in the Khatlon Region  
Baljuvon Ghozimalik Qabodiyon Panj Chubek 
Beshkent Danghara Qizil-Mazor Sarband Jilikul 
Bokhtar  Yovon Qumsangir Farkhor Shahrtuz 
Vakhsh Kolkhozobod Muminobod Khovaling Shuro-obod 
Vose’ Kulob Norak Hojamaston  
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APPENDIX 2:  COMPANY LAND OWNERSHIP PER DISTRICT  
 
The information below identifies the major companies, their main activities in Tajikistan, and 
the amount of land they occupy in descending order (which totals approximately 68,881 total 
hectors of land in Northern Tajikistan). 
 
 
Major Cotton Companies 
Active in Northern 
Tajikistan 
Company Classification Land Occupation in 
Hectares 
Khujand Invest Cotton Investor / Procurement 
Company 
22,209 
Olimi Karmzod Company Investor / Procurement 
Company 
11,667 
Merkot Company  8,600 
Dehqon A closed type of Joint Stock 
Company 
5,415 
Mastchoh Invest Joint Stock Company 5,268 
Habib Joint Stock Company 2,725 
Agrofarmer  2,650 
Zafarabad Invest  2,200 
Sughdagroserv  2,098 
Invest-Agro A closed type of Joint Stock 
Company 
1,720 
Tijorat  1,470 
Zarzamin A closed type of Joint Stock 
Company 
1,017 
Puloton Joint Venture 960 
Kabool Tajik Textiles Joint Venture 882 
   
TOTAL LAND 
OCCUPATION 
 68,881 
 
 
The Zafarbad district is located in the Sughd region, where much of the farmer 
surveys were conducted.  The Zafarbad district is a major cotton growing area in the Sughd 
region and serves as a good sample of the presence of invested companies in the country, 
particularly in the north.  There are approximately 1,560 different types of active companies 
in the region, including joint ventures, state, and private cooperatives.  Of those companies, 
1,200 do direct business in the cotton industry of Tajikistan.  Practically all of the cotton 
companies active in the Sughd region also do business in the district of Zafarbad.  The 
following chart presents the companies active specifically in the Zafarbad region in 
descending order, as well as the districts they occupy. Also exemplified are the percentages 
of the company’s holdings in the Zafarabad district in relation to the other districts where 
they are present in northern Tajikistan. 
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Company District Amount of 
Occupied Land 
(Hectares) 
Percentage of 
Total Occupied 
Land 
B. Gafurov 7,545 34% 
Asht 5,417 24.4% 
Zafarabad 3,042 13.7% 
Kanibadam 2,345 10.6% 
J. Rasulov 1,939 8.7% 
Mastchah 1,096 5% 
Ganchi 555 2.5% 
Ayni 200 0.9% 
 
 
 
Khujand Invest Cotton 
Istaravshan 70 0.32% 
    
Mastchah  7,400 63.4% Olimi Karmzod 
Company Zafarabad 4,267 36.6% 
    
Agrofarm Zafarabad 2,650 100% 
    
Zafarabad Invest Zafarabad 2,200 100% 
    
Zafarabad 1000 47.7% 
Istravshan 338 16.1% 
J.Rasulov 296 14.1% 
Spitamen 274 13% 
Asht 120 5.7% 
Sughdagroserv 
Ayni 70 3.3% 
    
Zafarabad  530 52.1% Zarzamin 
Mastchah 487 47.9% 
    
Kabool Tajik Textiles Zafarabad 882 100% 
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APPENDIX 3:  SAMPLE SURVEY WITH SAMADOC FARMER COMPANY AND 
ITS USE OF STUDENT/CHILD LABOR   
 
Main information 
 
Which year was your farm established?  2004 
 
How many hectares of cotton does your farm grow? 6,0 
 
How many employees do you have in your farm? 4 
 
Information about pickers 
 
How many students work in your farm during the cotton harvest season? 25 
 
For how long do students work in a cotton field? – 
 
How much do you pay for 1 kg of cotton? 13 dirham 
 
How and on what basis are students hired in your farm? Verbal agreement  
 
General Nature of the Activity 
 
How many employees work permanently in your farm now (2006)? What about last year?  
And in the year of the establishment of the farm? 4 
 
What is the profit of your farm now? No profit   
What about in 2005? No profit   
And in the year of establishment? – No profit  
 
How much are your employees paid in your farm? 20 somoni 
 
Does your farm have debts from other state/investment farms? Yes 
 
Fertilizers 
 
Which fertilizers do you use? Ammoniac selytra 
 
Please name your suppliers of fertilizers? from creditors 
 
The price of cotton 
 
What is the price of cotton? USD 750 
 
Do you think there are alternative buyers of cotton? No 
 
Which companies buy cotton normally? Our creditors sell it to foreign countries  
 
 
Barriers and Obstacles 
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Please tell us how problematic are the following factors for the functioning and development 
of your business 
 
 Not problematic Little 
problematic 
Problematic 
enough 
I don’t know 
Debts 
 
1 2 3? 4 
Corruption 
 
1 2 3? 4  
Lack of human 
resources 
 
1? 2 3 4 
Low salaries for 
employees 
 
1 2 3? 4 
High taxes 
 
1 2? 3 4 
Funds 
 
1 2 3? 4 
Transport 
 
1 2 3? 4 
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APPENDIX 4:  COMPILATION OF SURVEYS OF STUDENT WORKERS 
 
BASIC INFORMATION: 
 
Sex:     
 
 
At which university do you study? 
 
HFTUT, TGU, TGUK, HGU 
 
Which year? 
 
5th -25 people         4th  – 32 p.               3rd .- 24 p.                2nd –18p.     1st -2 p. 
 
 
General information  
 
Are you familiar with the contracts about training between universities and students? 
 
Yes   No 
 
 
If yes, is the obligation of students to participate in cotton harvesting campaign stipulated in 
that contract? 
 
No there is no mention about that. The contract only says that students must participate in 
public events. In the contract of TGUPB there is a provision stating that students are 
obliged to participate in agricultural works. Do not remember. I am not aware. 
 
Have you ever participated in cotton harvesting? 
 
Yes  No     
 
Which year?   In 2001  – 2 people 
                        In 2002  – 12 people 
                       In 2003  -25 people 
                       In 2004 – 41 people 
                      In 2005 – 51 people       
                      In 2006 –3people       
 
 
Did you go to pick cotton voluntarily? 
 
Yes  No    
 
 
If not, on what basis: 
 
 
М-61 
 
F-40 
32 
99 2 
43 58 
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I was forced. The university threatened to expel. On the basis of the TGUPB contract. By 
the order of the rector (head of the university). For the benefit of the organization.   
 
 
Did the university put conditions in case if you do not participate in cotton harvesting? 
 
Yes  No  
 
 
If yes, what kind of conditions. 
 
I was threatened with dismissal. I was threatened with failure at the exams. I was told if I 
do not go to pick cotton, I will pay 500 somoni or will be expelled. I was threatened that I 
would not be allowed to do exams. I was told that if I pay I can choose not to go to cotton 
picking. 
 
 
During the cotton harvesting campaign you prefer (to study or pick cotton)? 
To study                           89 
To pick cotton            12 
 
How is cotton picking reflected in your education? 
Well                 13 
Badly                   63 
No reflection                  25 
 
How do you assess the living conditions? 
Well  __________    28 
Badly     __________    50 
No reflection     __________    23 
 
Are you satisfied with the food provided? 
Yes           __________29 
No        __________72 
 
If not, then why? 
 
The same type of food, only pasta, they give us little, the technology of cooking if not 
observed and the hygiene is observed, not tasty, no sugar, no clean water, we drank from 
irrigation canals, lack of vitamins. No nutrition. They fed us with 3rd grade pasta. 
Even dog did not eat the food that they organized for us. 
Everything is boiled and not tasty and the cook was not good. 
Always the same: pasta and soup, I think the leftovers from lunches were added to dinners. 
 
 
Do you suffer from chronic or serious diseases? 
Yes           __________28 
No        __________73 
 
How often are you checked by a doctor? 
77 24 
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Once a week       __________15 
Once in a fortnight__________7 
Once in a month          __________12 
Never                  __________63 
Every day        __________1pers.   
5-6 times a day       __________1pers. 
 
 
 
Are you guarded by the law enforcement agencies? 
Yes           __________17 
No        __________80 
For 2 days_______2  
 
 
 
Who pays for your expenses to visit home?  
 
No-one. Parents. University has never paid.  
The visit home was organized by the university and it paid the expenses. The organizers of 
the university paid the expenses. Until the centre it was paid by the university and after that 
myself.  
 
Are you forced to do other additional works, if you don’t meet the quota on cotton? 
 
Yes    __________52 
No __________ 47  
 
 
If yes, then what kind of work? 
  
To clean vegetables, sweep the building, help the cook, clean the barrack, some girls were 
forced to pick to meet quota even if it was already dark, helped in any work, cut wood, help 
to make fire, carry water, collect wood, at nights picked cotton in order to meet the quota, 
educational works, do shifts. Pay for expenses. Worked at the university. At nights we were 
not allowed to sleep, we were forced to cut wood. We were forced to clean toilets. At nights 
we picked the rest of the unpicked cotton. 
 
Is your work to pick cotton paid? 
Yes  ___________71 
No __________28 
 
 
If yes, how much are you paid and how often? 
 
Paid only in case if picked a lot. 
Very little, I do not even remember how much. 
I was paid after I came back from cotton picking, approximately 20 somoni for each. 
Paid after each season, depending on how much you picked. 
Paid only if you picked above the quota. 
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Paid only to those who picked 100-120 kg. 
Paid for ten days, 10 dirhams for 1 kg.. 
Paid 40 somoni per month. 
Received 30 somoni for 10 days. 
Received 25 somoni for 10 days, but not in time. 
Received 6 somoni for 10 days. 
Received 15 dirhams for 1 kg. They were late with payment for 1-2 weeks. 
After coming back received 14 somoni each 
Received 9 somoni per week, not in time. 
Paid 7-9 somoni, but not in time, everything depended on the brigadier. 
12-14 somoni per week. 
Little! Clean cotton costs USD 3,5 and we were paid for our work 10 dirhams. 
Humiliating.  
Paid for 10 days depending on how much we picked 
 0,25 dirhams for 1 kg, but late. 
20-30 somoni for 10 days. 
0,20 dirhams for kg, but late. 
 50 somoni for 30 days, but at the end we did not get even a penny.  
Everything we received we spent on food 
At the end received 89 somoni. 
At the end received only 6 somoni. 
At the en received 23 somoni. 
Don’t remember, what we received cannot be called money! 
7 dirhams for kg. 
 10-15 somoni for 10 days. 
Paid little and rarely. 
13 dirhams for 1 kg, were paid rarely 30-35 somoni in total. 
Money was taken for food. 
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APPENDIX 5:  ADDITIONAL RESPONSES FROM A STUDENT SURVEY 
 
In general in our brigade has 35 people, but the number of people arrived was more than 400. 
The exact number of students is not disclosed. 
 
They introduced several daily regimes for students: 
 
1)  The first group wakes up at 4:00 a.m., at 6.00 a.m. they are already in the fields; take a 
break from 12.00 to 14.00.  Then they continue working from 14.00 to 17.00. 
 
2) The rest of the students wake up at 6.00 a.m., at 8.00 a.m. they are in the fields, have lunch 
from 12.00 to 14.00 and from 14.00 to 18.00 they continue working. All of us work eight 
hours a day. 
 
During these eight hours each student must pick 50 kg.  One kg of cotton costs 13 dirhams, 
but recently I have found out that we will be paid only 12 dirhams, because they need to pay 
for the work of the tea house people and cooks. 
 
Those who do not pick cotton were subject to the following punishments: some wake up very 
early in the morning and cut wood to prepare tea.  Some clean the places around barracks. 
These punishments depend on the “teacher’s creativity.” 
 
The distance to the field is approximately 1-1.5 km. We used to walk this distance by foot. 
Farmers are not happy with us. They say that we are causing only harm. If they pick cotton 
themselves, they can manage to do it in 10-15 days, but we drag it for a month, and then all 
the money that we get are from their accounts. 
 
At the beginning the attitude of students was very bad, and then they got used to it. They say 
as a joke: “Cotton is in the morning and during the day – to work like in heaven, in the 
evenings to rest like in heaven, and in the nights to sleep like in heaven, because cotton is the 
symbol of a holiday.” 
 
As expected, the teachers totally support the position of the university.  
 
The hot meal is once a day. We do not complain for food, but some of the food, mainly meat, 
gets spoiled and we had to refuse food with meat.  The food is normal. It costs approximately 
3 somoni a day.  In the mornings we have butter, one bread for three, and a hot meal for 
lunch and dinner.  The cost of the food is compensated from the cost of the cotton. The food 
is cooked in the kitchen and we have self-service.  
 
The hygiene is not good. There is no bath, at least for 20 days that I was here, there was no 
bath. 
 
Cotton picking is a good work from one hand, but on the other hand it is bad. 
 
The first day when we arrived: 
 1) I would like to note that the living conditions were much better than in other barracks. We 
slept on the floor i.e. there were beddings on the floor and under beddings there was a thin 
cellophane. There were two small windows in the barrack and we could hardly get light 
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through them. We were 35 people and we hardly fitted in the barrack. One even slept on a 
compact bed in front of the door. The barrack was full of mice. 
 
In our barrack we did not have any problems with water. Outside there was a pipe from 
which we could get water from the lake.  After walking we noticed that others had problems 
with water.  Even those who are in the quarters had to walk 100-150 meters to get water.  The 
boys do not have problem with that, but for the girls it was a problem! We had to go with 
them to get water to drink. 
 
There were problems with the food at the beginning. But it was good that we took water and 
food for three days. 
 
In the mornings we received butter (one butter for 12 people), sugar and bread (one bread for 
three). For lunch we ate something light, soup or pasta. There was a problem with lack of 
calories in food, potatoes were not properly boiled and everything was not boiled properly. 
Food was prepared in a place with no hygiene. Every day we received meat but it used to get 
spoiled every day. There was no place to keep that kind of food.  
 
In the first season the payment for food was 2 somoni and 60 dirhams. It was equal to 20 kg 
of cotton. The menu included only: pasta, vegetable soup, soup with rice and just soup. It was 
good that once in two weeks they cooked plov and thanks to parents, who came to visit us. 
 
One day during the time when we were picking cotton they announced that cotton costs 20 
dirhams. From this they would take 3 dirhams for tax, 2 dirhams for teachers and 2 dirhams 
to the person who makes tea and to the cook and we would receive at the end 13 dirhams. 
The payment for cotton is fine but it is not divided into periods. By the way, we received 
payment only for 15 days, and we were told that we would receive for the other 15 days at the 
university, as if they did not receive the money yet. 
 
The collective farm made some mistakes. Nobody was there to guard the cotton and as a 
result while weighing the difference was in tons. They had to subtract it from our kgs. By that 
time I personally picked more than 500 kg., but received money only for 400kg and the same 
was with others. Some were even in debt. 
 
Regarding the hygiene, we were promised a bath, but we had to take shower with cold water 
outside, especially at nights it was cold. Some even had flu. My friend got sick. He even had 
blood coming out from his nose because of high temperature, but the teacher still sent him to 
the field. I felt really sorry for him. We were not checked by a doctor form the first day until 
the end. Here are some examples: today my friend, who had pneumonia three months ago 
went to see a doctor to complain about pain in his throat. The doctor even did not write him a 
prescription for medicine. Another sick student went to see a doctor and he was released for 
10-12 days. Several days ago one student had pain in his stomach and could not sleep for 
three days, besides he had a diarrhea.  And our “good” doctor did not give him a diagnosis. 
After three days he was taken to the Zfarabad hospital, where he was treated for three days. 
 
Before we left to pick cotton we found out that one student had rheumatism, but nobody 
believed him and said that he would go anyways.  It has been already five days that he has 
been suffering form pain. Because of him we hardly sleep at nights. We even took him to the 
hospital so that he could have some shots from pain.  He was released on the sixth day. 
 
 31
One day one student was taken to the hospital with the suspicion of appendicitis, but 
thankfully those suspicions were not correct. 
 
There are no guards. Although among students of our university there were no accidents, but 
not far from us someone was killed and there was one suicide. 
 
Once three local guys beat three of our students. One of them even had a knife, thankfully 
nobody suffered. When we went to help them, local guys run away, but one of my course 
mates was lying unconscious.  After that we did not have any accidents. 
 
One day many students were punished at once for picking little cotton. Some were made to 
cut wood and some did the cleaning. When the teacher was asked what is the reason for 
punishment, despite the fact that they picked cotton.  He replied it was “for the sake of a 
matter.” 
